Tuesday, December 20, 2011



 Who is an "officer of the court"?

A judge is an officer of the court, as well as are all attorneys. A state judge is a state judicial officer, paid by the State to act impartially and lawfully. A federal judge is a federal judicial officer, paid by the federal government to act impartially and lawfully. State and federal attorneys fall into the same general category and must meet the same requirements. A judge is not the court. People v. Zajic, 88 Ill.App.3d 477, 410 N.E.2d 626 (1980).

2. What is "fraud on the court"?

Whenever any officer of the court commits fraud during a proceeding in the court, he/she is engaged in "fraud upon the court". In Bulloch v. United States, 763 F.2d 1115, 1121 (10th Cir. 1985), the court stated "Fraud upon the court is fraud which is directed to the judicial machinery itself and is not fraud between the parties or fraudulent documents, false statements or perjury. ... It is where the court or a member is corrupted or influenced or influence is attempted or where the judge has not performed his judicial function --- thus where the impartial functions of the court have been directly corrupted." 

"Fraud upon the court" has been defined by the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals to "embrace that species of fraud which does, or attempts to, defile the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court so that the judicial machinery can not perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases that are presented for adjudication." Kenner v. C.I.R., 387 F.3d 689 (1968); 7 Moore's Federal Practice, 2d ed., p. 512, ¶ 60.23. The 7th Circuit further stated "a decision produced by fraud upon the court is not in essence a decision at all, and never becomes final."

3. What effect does an act of "fraud upon the court" have upon the court proceeding?

"Fraud upon the court" makes void the orders and judgments of that court. 

It is also clear and well-settled Illinois law that any attempt to commit "fraud upon the court" vitiates the entire proceeding. The People of the State of Illinois v. Fred E. Sterling, 357 Ill. 354; 192 N.E. 229 (1934) ("The maxim that fraud vitiates every transaction into which it enters applies to judgments as well as to contracts and other transactions."); Allen F. Moore v. Stanley F. Sievers, 336 Ill. 316; 168 N.E. 259 (1929) ("The maxim that fraud vitiates every transaction into which it enters ..."); In re Village of Willowbrook, 37 Ill.App.2d 393 (1962) ("It is axiomatic that fraud vitiates everything."); Dunham v. Dunham, 57 Ill.App. 475 (1894), affirmed 162 Ill. 589 (1896); Skelly Oil Co. v. Universal Oil Products Co., 338 Ill.App. 79, 86 N.E.2d 875, 883-4 (1949); Thomas Stasel v. The American Home Security Corporation, 362 Ill. 350; 199 N.E. 798 (1935). 

Under Illinois and Federal law, when any officer of the court has committed "fraud upon the court", the orders and judgment of that court are void, of no legal force or effect.

4. What causes the "Disqualification of Judges?"

Federal law requires the automatic disqualification of a Federal judge under certain circumstances. 

In 1994, the U.S. Supreme Court held that "Disqualification is required if an objective observer would entertain reasonable questions about the judge's impartiality. If a judge's attitude or state of mind leads a detached observer to conclude that a fair and impartial hearing is unlikely, the judge must be disqualified." [Emphasis added]. Liteky v. U.S., 114 S.Ct. 1147, 1162 (1994). 

Courts have repeatedly held that positive proof of the partiality of a judge is not a requirement, only the appearance of partiality. Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 108 S.Ct. 2194 (1988) (what matters is not the reality of bias or prejudice but its appearance); United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1985) (Section 455(a) "is directed against the appearance of partiality, whether or not the judge is actually biased.") ("Section 455(a) of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. §455(a), is not intended to protect litigants from actual bias in their judge but rather to promote public confidence in the impartiality of the judicial process."). 

That Court also stated that Section 455(a) "requires a judge to recuse himself in any proceeding in which her impartiality might reasonably be questioned." Taylor v. O'Grady, 888 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1989). In Pfizer Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1972), the Court stated that "It is important that the litigant not only actually receive justice, but that he believes that he has received justice." 

The Supreme Court has ruled and has reaffirmed the principle that "justice must satisfy the appearance of justice", Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 80 S.Ct. 1038 (1960), citing Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14, 75 S.Ct. 11, 13 (1954). A judge receiving a bribe from an interested party over which he is presiding, does not give the appearance of justice. 

"Recusal under Section 455 is self-executing; a party need not file affidavits in support of recusal and the judge is obligated to recuse herself sua sponte under the stated circumstances." Taylor v. O'Grady, 888 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1989). 

Further, the judge has a legal duty to disqualify himself even if there is no motion asking for his disqualification. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals further stated that "We think that this language [455(a)] imposes a duty on the judge to act sua sponte, even if no motion or affidavit is filed." Balistrieri, at 1202. 

Judges do not have discretion not to disqualify themselves. By law, they are bound to follow the law. Should a judge not disqualify himself as required by law, then the judge has given another example of his "appearance of partiality" which, possibly, further disqualifies the judge. Should another judge not accept the disqualification of the judge, then the second judge has evidenced an "appearance of partiality" and has possibly disqualified himself/herself. None of the orders issued by any judge who has been disqualified by law would appear to be valid. It would appear that they are void as a matter of law, and are of no legal force or effect. 

Should a judge not disqualify himself, then the judge is violation of the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. United States v. Sciuto, 521 F.2d 842, 845 (7th Cir. 1996) ("The right to a tribunal free from bias or prejudice is based, not on section 144, but on the Due Process Clause."). 

Should a judge issue any order after he has been disqualified by law, and if the party has been denied of any of his / her property, then the judge may have been engaged in the Federal Crime of "interference with interstate commerce". The judge has acted in the judge's personal capacity and not in the judge's judicial capacity. It has been said that this judge, acting in this manner, has no more lawful authority than someone's next-door neighbor (provided that he is not a judge). However some judges may not follow the law. 

If you were a non-represented litigant, and should the court not follow the law as to non-represented litigants, then the judge has expressed an "appearance of partiality" and, under the law, it would seem that he/she has disqualified him/herself. 

However, since not all judges keep up to date in the law, and since not all judges follow the law, it is possible that a judge may not know the ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court and the other courts on this subject. Notice that it states "disqualification is required" and that a judge "must be disqualified" under certain circumstances. 

The Supreme Court has also held that if a judge wars against the Constitution, or if he acts without jurisdiction, he has engaged in treason to the Constitution. If a judge acts after he has been automatically disqualified by law, then he is acting without jurisdiction, and that suggest that he is then engaging in criminal acts of treason, and may be engaged in extortion and the interference with interstate commerce. 

Courts have repeatedly ruled that judges have no immunity for their criminal acts. Since both treason and the interference with interstate commerce are criminal acts, no judge has immunity to engage in such acts 


Last updated 4 months agoFrom Wikipedia, the free encyclopediaJump to: navigation, search This article includes a list of references, related reading or external links, but its sources remain unclear because it lacks inline citations. Please improve this article by introducing more precise citations. (January 2012)

This article relies largely or entirely upon a single source. Please help improve this article by introducing citations to additional sources. More details and relevant discussion can be found on the talk page. (January 2012)

In a jury trial, a directed verdict is an order from the presiding judge to the jury to return a particular verdict. Typically, the judge orders a directed verdict after finding that no reasonable jury could reach a decision to the contrary. After a directed verdict, there is no longer any need for the jury to decide the case.

A judge may order a directed verdict as to an entire case or only to certain issues. While the motion is not often granted, it is routinely made as a means of preserving appeal rights later.

In a criminal case in the United States, a judge may only order a directed verdict for acquittal, for the ability to convict is reserved to the jury. In a civil action, a related concept to the directed verdict is that of a non-suit. A judge may decide to direct a verdict of not guilty if there is not a scintilla of evidence to prove a guilty verdict.

The phrase arose when judges actually directed a jury to leave the courtroom, deliberate, and return with only the verdict predetermined by the judge. At least one jury ignored this instruction and returned a contrary verdict, leading to quite an angry response from an appellate court.[citation needed] For most of modern judicial history, however, judges in the United States have directed a verdict without a need of a jury. This concept has largely been replaced in the American legal system with judgment as a matter of law.


Perjury occurs when a witness testifying under oath or affirmation gives false testimony concerning a material matter with the willful intent to provide false testimony.  Materiality is one of the elements of perjury.  It is said that a statement is material if it has a natural tendency to influence, or is capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to whom it is addressed.

Here is an excellent link to an overview of the federal law regarding perjury:
If you feel that perjury has been committed in your loved one's case, please contact the federal authorities.


Scintilla-of-Evidence Rule Law & Legal Definition

Scintilla of evidence rule is a common law principle that a motion for summary judgment or for directed verdict cannot be granted when there exists even the slightest amount of relevant evidence. The matter should then be tried by a jury. Generally, federal courts do not follow this rule. The scintilla of evidence rule has been discarded in nearly all state jurisdictions. However verdicts must be based upon substantial evidence and that evidence must be reasonably believable.

The following is an example of a case law on scintilla of evidence rule :

The "scintilla of evidence rule" means that there must be some evidence arising out of testimony which elucidates the issues of fact and which enables jury to form an intelligent conclusion, but does not authorize admission of speculative, theoretical and hypothetical views. [In re Crawford, 205 S.C. 72 (S.C. 1944)]


dead man statute is a statute designed to prevent perjury in a civil case by prohibiting a witness who is an interested party from testifying about communications or transactions with a deceased person (a "decedent") against the decedent's estate unless there is a waiver.
This prohibition applies only against a witness who has an interest in the outcome of the case and applies only where that witness is testifying for his own interests and against the interests of the decedent. Furthermore, the restriction only exists in civil cases, never in criminal cases.
The restriction can be waived. A waiver can occur in a number of ways:
  1. The decedent's representative fails to object to the testimony;
  2. The decedent's own representative testifies to the communication;
  3. The decedent's testimony is brought before the jury in the form of a deposition or in another form.
In the United States there is no federal law imposing such a restriction,[1] but about half of the U.S. States have enacted a dead man statute. Some states have enacted compromise variations to the rule. For example, in Virginia, an interested witness may only testify as to the statements of the deceased if this testimony is corroborated by a disinterested witness. In other states, such as Illinois, the rule has been expanded to prevent an interested party from testifying about communications with a minor or a legally incompetent person.

From Wikipedia:  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dead_Man's_Statute

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